contrast, their response is typical of the call for an entirely new approach, a much more rapid and uncompromising 'decarbonisation'. From the scientific perspective, such an 'emergency critique' argues that official or orthodox analyses have misread, dismissed or understated basic (climate) system behaviours. Subsequently, the latter models minimise or disregard the tendency of change to occur as dramatic, critical or catastrophic shifts in the climate system, as distinct from orderly, progressive changes. This critique is important in consideration of thresholds of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference' 12 in the climate system. James Hansen, 13 for instance, has argued that 'tipping points' are likely to occur well below the 2°C level. An important body of scientific opinion supports this position. 14 The 'safe' limit to climatic warming, Hansen argues, is 'at most, about 1ºC greater than the year 2000 global temperature', 15 or around 1.8ºC above pre-industrial levels. Other opinion has put this limit at 1.5°C, or around 350ppm CO2-e. 16 Recent scientific efforts have aimed to systematically reconceptualise norms applying to human-ecological behaviours, including climate systems, in terms of 'planetary boundaries', within which can be considered 'a safe operating space'. 17 Such 'boundaries' are intended to be 'set at a "safe" distance from a dangerous level … or from [a natural] threshold'. 18 In respect of this analysis, the 'safe' zone has already been surpassed and humanity is well within the zone of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference'.
The potentially catastrophic mechanism is the inexorable tendency of the climate system, once critical thresholds have been reached or surpassed, to produce 'positive feedback' relationships, leading to reinforcement, acceleration and/or amplification of changes, which then become irreversible. 'Abrupt' climate change, 19 proceeding in this manner, is inevitably complex, multifaceted and subject to specific and predictive uncertainties. 20 It has been noted that these tendencies may already be underway. 21 _____________________________________________________________________________________ the sustainability crisis in a way that minimizes the changes in business models and power relations, at the expense of really solving the problems. 12 See, eg, James Hansen, 'Defusing The Global Warming Time Bomb ' (2004) 290 Scientific American 69, 72-3:
The goal of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, produced in Rio De Janeiro in 1989, is to stabilize atmospheric composition to 'prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' and to achieve that goal in ways that do not disrupt the global economy. Defining the level of warming that constitutes 'dangerous anthropogenic interference' is thus a crucial but difficult part of the problem. Symptoms of climate system 'tipping points' include sea level rise, rapid melting of Arctic summer sea ice (which occurred in the summer of 2007), collapse of the Greenland and/or West Antarctic icesheets, rapid glacial retreat, thawing of Arctic permafrost, mass extinctions (biodiversity crises), and ocean acidification. 22 Sea level rise is commonly viewed as a key symptom of climate change. 23 The IPPC's 2007 report predicted sea level rise in the order of 0.18-0.59m by 2100. 24 This assessment is particularly controversial. 25 The IPCC position is premised essentially on the effects of thermal expansion of the oceans as they warm; consideration of major, catastrophic ruptures such as rapid melting of the Greenland icecap (symptomatic of 'abrupt' change) are not incorporated into the IPCC models. The 'critique' position is not only that such ruptures ought to be incorporated into scientific models, but that empirical observations tend to support a 'quickening pace' of warming and instability beyond what the IPCC has reported. 26 The notion of rapid, nonlinear climate change is reinforced by paleoclimatic research, that is, emerging knowledge of climatic shifts in earlier periods in the Earth's history. 27 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 21 Spratt and Sutton, above n 1, 4; Hansen, 'Tipping Point', above n 15, 9; Rockstrom et al, above n 16, 54: 'Our preliminary analysis indicates we have already transgressed three boundaries (climate change, the rate of biodiversity loss, and the rate of interference with the nitrogen cycle).' The situation in the Arctic is viewed as a signal development, as reflectivity of the Arctic sea ice ('albedo effect') is an important mechanism of stability in global (and regional) temperature. Disintegration of the Artic sea ice represents a critical moment in system instability, or 'runaway' climate change. Hansen notes the two major catastrophic sources of instability are sea level rise and mass species extinction, the latter occurring especially as climate zones and isotherms shift faster than ecosystems can naturally evolve or species migrate. See Since the last IPCC report, updated trends in surface ocean temperatures and heat content have been published. These revised estimates show … that the ocean has warmed significantly in recent years. Current estimates indicate that ocean warming is about 50% greater than has been previously reported by the IPCC. The new estimates help to better explain the trend in sea level that has been observed in recent decades as most of the sea-level rise observed until recently has been the result of thermal expansion of seawater. The rate of sea-level rise has increased in the period from 1993 to the present… largely due to growing contributions of iceloss from Greenland … and Antarctica … Steffen, above n 22, (research post-Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC confirms climate change at upper end of IPCC projections and reinforces likelihood of long-term positive feedback processes). Acknowledgement of instability in the climate system leads to the conclusion that there is limited time and room for action. In particular, the capacity of the climate system to 'safely' accommodate 2-3ºC warming, or atmospheric CO2-e levels of 450-550ppm appears at best reckless. A zone of climate 'safety' requires avoidance of key events precipitating positive feedbacks. Given that this threshold has probably already been passed, the underpinning argument of those arguing for a 'climate emergency' is that we are already in the perilous zone and that the imperative is to retreat from it. Not only must measures be taken to halt the warming process, it is necessary to establish a cooling process.
THE 'CLIMATE EMERGENCY' PROGRAM: TOWARD A 'SAFE OPERATING SPACE'?
In the context of this 'climate emergency' analysis, proposals for medium-to long-term 'peak' and reduction strategies may well be inadequate to the task of stabilisation of emissions outside of the zone of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference'. They do not establish controls on carbon emissions capable of providing reasonable or strong capacity to avoid 'tipping points' in climatic energy balance. Broadly speaking, the above analysis assumes the 'safe operating space' at around 1.5°C warming or 350 ppm of atmospheric carbon concentration. The December 2009 Copenhagen Accord of the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change ('Framework Convention') produced a non-binding agreement on the need to keep global temperature increases 'below 2 degrees Celsius'. 28 Yet even the capacity of states to contain warming to within 2ºC appears unlikely to be met based on current emissions abatement targets and the longer-term rates subsequently required to meet the 2ºC limit. 29 As McIntosh has argued, 'the likelihood of warming being kept within the 2ºC limit appears to be diminutive' 30 and there is an 'element of unreality about the positioning of developed countries [including Australia]'. 31 He further alludes to the 2ºC limit being unachievable, under present circumstances, without 'dramatic change in the global political environment' 32 or 'major political and economic upheaval and/or the rapid development and deployment of low cost zero or negative emission energy technologies. Ibid 23. If 'tipping points' (carbon cycle feedbacks) are at the higher end of predictions then it may be that the only way to limit warming below 2ºC post-2020 may be 'to pursue a If the need for 'rapid, deep and sustained' cuts to emissions is assumed, and if such a program for present purposes is limited to the Australian contribution to global action, what measures are to be considered as adequate to this systemic problem, and further what is the relationship of such a policy program to the wider legal question of an 'emergency' approach? Departure from the so-called 'business as usual' equates to departure from certain extant economic and social norms. These may include major changes in patterns of economic investment, dismantling and/or realignment of industries, major shifts in transport, domestic and other social behaviours, and changes to land-use patterns, bearing in mind the largest national sources of GHG emissions (stationary energy, transport and agriculture). 34 The central policy mechanism of the present federal Labor government in respect of climate change, and specifically controls on carbon emissions, is the establishment of an 'emissions trading scheme' ('ETS'), that is, establishment of tradable property rights in emissions permits combined with overall targets on emissions. Legislation establishing the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme ('CPRS') 35 has been put forward by the federal Labor government (although now deferred). This proposed legislation would adopt a 450 ppm threshold, 36 and therefore does not purport to achieve stabilisation of emissions within the 'safe operating space' noted above.
Yet the issue here is perhaps less whether the present ETS scheme conforms to any 'safe operating space' paradigm (which it does not) than whether an ETS policy model per se (or rather an ETS as a central plank, combined with other, complementary measures) can be adapted to the much more dramatic targets and conditions associated with the 'climate emergency' critique and/or the 'safe operating space'. The answer to that question is uncertain. The use of market mechanisms and 'propertisation' of emissions has been criticised as containing structural shortcomings, such as complexity, inequity, enforcement difficulties, inflexibility in 'cap-setting', and heavy subsidisation to polluters. 37 Notwithstanding these points, the attempt to _____________________________________________________________________________________ radical decarbonisation strategy that is well beyond that currently being contemplated': at 22. 45 -encompass an economy-wide mechanism of change (rationing) with sectoral prescriptions in energy efficiency, energy supply, transport and aviation. He does not deny that his program would be a significant departure from the status quo, compelling major changes in policy and economic and social behaviour. In addition to a form of carbon rationing (Monbiot refers to the Tyndall Centre model), he proposes restructuring of energy systems toward a diversity of supply sources (especially gas and renewables) and delivery systems (centralised and 'micro-generation'), combined with greater energy efficiencies. 46 In respect of transport, his most radical ventures would include effective 'capping and rationing' of road space 47 (and curtailment of private vehicles), and the abandonment of mass aviation. 48 Therefore, where Monbiot foresees profound departure from current norms in social and economic practice, it is in regards to certain economic and social 'freedoms' generally associated with mass-consumer conditions in the developed countries, including abundant fossil fuel based energy, car-based private transport and mass aviation. Although such a transformative program is developed in a primarily UK context, Monbiot's broad themes are generally transferable to Australian circumstances, although perhaps understated for Australian conditions. 49
MEANS TO THE 'SAFE OPERATING SPACE': EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT?
Implicit in most of the scientific and academic opinion noted is the need for exceptional action on climate change, which is to say governmental and public action outside of prevailing norms, especially economic and socio-ecological norms. The gulf, Given, for instance, higher per capita carbon emissions rates for Australia and relatively high reliance on coal-fired electricity supply and generation of export revenues from export of coal.
for instance, between likely and required emissions reduction trajectories identified by Macintosh leads to the inference that a dramatic, indeed radical, shift in approach will be needed to contain warming within 2ºC by 2100. As noted, that target may be too conservative to stabilise emissions within the climatic 'safe operating space.' The issue of achieving stabilisation is not solely a matter of policy prescriptions or content. If extraordinary approaches are required, this fact also bears on the form or mode of government by which such changes are to be (or might be) achieved. The presumed facts and the language of 'emergency' implies the use of emergency government, or the 'state of emergency', as a formal and juridical means of confronting the crisis. It is no coincidence that Spratt and Sutton and others 50 make reference to the use of emergency -specifically, wartime -state powers as a means to achieving the normative and behavioural change. The failure to consider the legal dimension of the programs they are proposing (or to consider it satisfactorily) is, in fact, a gap in their analyses and prescriptions. Several obvious questions arise: what precisely do we understand by 'emergency laws', or the 'state of emergency'? How might such modes of government be applied to the (socio) ecological crisis of climate change, and in particular to the exceptional policy and practical changes arguably consistent with a 'safe operating space' (at least as far as Australia's contribution to this project is concerned)? If such modes and courses of action are applicable, can they be accommodated within the existing (Australian) legal system? Theories of emergency government 'Emergency' may be 'an elastic concept', 51 but in Australia it is given no express constitutional form. The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben noted, in respect of the emergency state, 'there is still no theory of the state of exception in public law and jurists and theorists of public law seem to regard the problem more as a quaestio facti than as a genuine juridical problem.' 52 Responding especially to the writings of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, Agamben has sought to meet this theoretical challenge. At this theoretical level, the concept of the 'state of emergency' is generally founded upon the dichotomy of (legal) norm and exception, and the 'ambiguous zone' 53 between them: 'It is the no man's land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life'. 54 A good deal of the theoretical analysis of emergency rule concerns itself with the legal problem as to whether or to what extent emergency (being the 'state of exception') can be, or ought to be, 'inside' or 'outside' of the legal order. The general poles of this debate may be identified with Schmitt, on the one hand, and Dicey, on the other hand, 55 where Schmitt asserts 56 that emergency rule is such that it 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ cannot be reduced to, or controlled by, legal rules and norms (and therefore the state of emergency lies outside of law), and the Diceyan analysis of the Westminster constitution is that even in exceptional circumstances the rule of law remains in place. 57 The continuity of legality in relation to emergency powers has generally become typical of the organisation and operation of emergency powers in advanced capitalist states. Dyzenhaus has referred to this as the 'compulsion of legality': 'the compulsion to justify all acts of state as having a legal warrant: the authority of law.' 58 He argues that two distinct 'cycles of legality' can be adopted. In one; the institutions of legal order cooperate in devising controls on public actors which ensure that their decisions comply with the principle of legality, understood as a substantive conception of the rule of law. In the other cycle, the content of legality is understood in an ever more formal or empty manner, resulting in the mere appearance or even … the pretence of legality. 59 That is, greater or lesser controls on the 'state of exception' can be imposed.
Yet, it has been recently argued that the norm/exception dichotomy is problematic, too limiting and unnecessarily formalistic in the definition of emergency government. It establishes too great an emphasis on resolving the 'boundary' question (between norm and exception) and, in respect of attempts to impose legality on exceptional powers, on formal, judicial controls. Nomi Claire Lazar has argued 60 that the issue of emergency is connected to the inherent tension between liberty and order in liberal democracy, that emergency or 'crisis' government is an indissoluble part of the legal and constitutional landscape, and that the preferable (and safest) approach is to construct emergency institutions adhering, at least generally, to desired norms rather then solely relying on positive rules to control and enable limits. Rather than a dichotomous situation, emergency is for Lazar, a continuum of legal, political and moral conditions between the 'principles of justice and principles of order, and between formal and informal constraints on power.' 61 The norm/exception _____________________________________________________________________________________ Schmitt, resolution of the problem of 'ambiguity' (as Agamben puts it) between norm (law) and exception (necessity) lies in the sphere of political action, and in particular with the conduct of sovereign power. The simple topographical opposition (inside/outside) implicit in these theories seems insufficient to account for the phenomenon it should explain … In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order. Lazar's general position is that emergency powers are not only unavoidable, but may be valuable. 71 Under the liberal dichotomy of freedom/justice and order, emergency powers have a role to play, and they must, in any case, always operate in a normative order, even if that order is not exclusively constituted of legal norms but also governed by wider political and socio-cultural norms. 72 Both emergency rule and the rule of law are, in practice, partial and not absolute. Yet Agamben's analysis is preferable, as it goes beyond the premise that emergency government is, ultimately, necessary and a corollary of order in the liberal state. The implicit critique of the liberal state in Agamben is that emergency government is inherent to it because it is a strategic condition of the state (and hence contingent) rather than immanent. 73 The normative framework of the state in this context, whether referring to 'ordinary' or emergency modes of government, might be said to be consistent with, and conditioned by, the general project of state power. This is to recognise that public power generally is purposive (serving interests, goals, social and economic forces, and particular political projects) and that emergency government is similarly conditioned. 74 
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Small emergencies are problems that are deemed worthy of exceptional solutions, but are simultaneously deemed too minor to warrant a full-fledged reassessment of constitutional structures and constitutional aspirations. The very idea that emergencies could be minor … suggests that they are not to be seen as fundamentally disruptive of the overall order of things … But small emergencies have been a standard feature of American constitutional life for so long that they have actually overtaken the constitutional dream of normal governance. Most Americans, however -including most constitutional theorists -are still dreaming. Emergency powers are justified -when they are justified -because they embody principles that already function under normal circumstances. Order is a value also, and it animates the day-to-day life of the state alongside liberal values … Rights are derogated for the sake of order every day. See, eg, Agamben, above n 52, 31: 'Far from being a response to a normative lacuna, the state of exception appears as the opening of a fictitious lacuna in the order for the purposes of safeguarding the existence of the norm and its applicability to the normal situation.' That is to say, the exception (declaration of emergency) is purposive and orientated toward a norm or governmental project of some description. He is critical, in addition, to the equation of the state of exception with the principle of 'necessity', as an attempt to ground exceptional powers on 'pure factuality'. He points out (at 29) that there is always a 'subjective' (ie political) dimension in the assertion of a 'state of necessity', one which relies if nothing else on a (political and strategic) decision. This strategic conception of the state of emergency renders more explicable the wide range of variability in scale, intensity, urgency and form in the operation of emergency measures or emergency government. Such measures are deployed to given ends, including, at the extreme, to martial law or revolution. Much more limited instances of emergency government obviously exist, such as response to localised natural disasters, and there are a broad range of other manifestations in between. The forms and permutations of emergency government represent adapted, contingent, strategic and, at times, political and/or partisan responses to circumstances of crisis. It is surely possible to delineate and classify emergency arrangements, such as the distinction between military and non-military emergencies, or between humanitarian (eg natural disaster), economic and military contingencies. In each case, the analysis may be instructive and useful but best read having regard to the capacity of the legal and political landscape to shift and sources of emergency to evolve, especially over the long term. Forms of emergency evolve as crisis evolves. This is essentially to reinforce the point that emergency government is best understood by way of a 'topographic' principle of analysis, although perhaps with some emphases on the question of form as much as scale and urgency in the institution of the emergency system. In the course of the twentieth century, wartime or 'national security' type emergency scenarios came to encompass pre-and post-hostility conditions, as well as the direct conduct of war. 75 New conditions of civil strife in the latter part of the last century have produced an obscurity between war and insurrection, 76 80 Economic emergency is a particular species of the 'state of exception'. They have again risen to prominence in the wake of the 'global financial crisis' and consequent national economic crises. For example, US 'bailout' arrangements were structured expressly as emergency measures. 81
Searching for the legal principles of a 'state of climate emergency' To a degree, then, the notion of a 'climate emergency', expressly or implicitly contained in the views of climate change writers noted above, refers to a new form of declared emergency, or at least development and/or revision of the models of the state of emergency as they have evolved hitherto. This is not to diminish the crucial role of the political, 82 or indeed policy, 83 content of the emergency, but perhaps, rather, to put it to one side for present purposes. There are comparisons between the climate emergency and economic emergencies. Additionally, the analogy has been drawn between circumstances of wartime transformation and mobilisation of the economy and what is necessary and may be achieved in the face of climate change. The object of the emergency in the latter circumstances is not military preparation but rapid decarbonisation aimed at the 'safe operating space', especially as applied to the economies of developed states.
The war analogy may be a useful one in the (Australian) constitutional context -at least insofar as it is possible to place both wartime emergency and a prospective climate emergency within the scope of purposive heads of legislative power provided to the federal Parliament by the Commonwealth Constitution. In the military situation, the key framework of constitutional authority is obviously the 'defence power' of the Commonwealth, provided for under s 51(vi) of the Constitution. Even at times of imminent military peril, such as the height of the Second World War, constitutional limits apply, although they have proved sufficiently malleable or flexible to accommodate exceptional measures, including rapid mobilisation under highly centralised executive control. 84 As in, eg, Bandt, above n 74.
83
For example, Monbiot, above n 44; Spratt and Sutton, above n 1; Australian Greens, above n 39.
84
The National Security Act 1939 (Cth) conferred exceptionally wide discretion on the executive, as its purpose was to provide the means to confront a 'total war' and, at times, the imminent threat of invasion. See, eg, B Sugerman and W J Dignam, 'The Defence Power And Total War' (1943) 17 Australian Law Journal 207, 210-11: Two broad circumstances stand in the forefront of any discussion of the scope of the defence power under the conditions of modern warfare. ... The first is the necessity key site in development of the jurisprudence of 'purposive' powers enumerated under section 51. The power is, as famously held, 'elastic' in nature, 85 subject to 'exigencies of the time,' 86 and to the factual distinction between war and peacetime. 87 Yet analogy to wartime powers ought not to be overplayed in the search for legal principles upon which to found a climate emergency. Although there may be 'national security' dimensions to the climate change crisis, 88 what is focused upon in rapid decarbonisation programs is essentially disjuncture from existing socioeconomic norms, which may be departure from norms of the industrial production cycle (eg coal-fired power) or the consumer cycle (eg private car use or mass aviation) but equally may be 'the prospect of unleashing the productive labour of humanity' 89 to found new norms, models and projects. The wartime comparison may be attractive as a metaphor of disjuncture, but of little use in relation to the content of norms or legal principles counter-posed to the industrial and economic status quo.
Rather, in any declaration of a climate change emergency, prevailing principles will proceed from the ecological nature of the crisis, that is, the context in which socioeconomic norms and paradigms are ultimately embedded within ecological limits, systems and conditions. The ecological crisis may be construed as a crisis in the reproduction of underpinning biogeophysical systems and on a relatively long-term time-scale. Indeed, in contrast to the timeframes of most emergencies, climate change might be understood as a 'catastrophe in slow motion', 90 with a highly (although not exclusively) prospective character. The primary and preferable means to confront and/or resolve the crisis remain, at least for the present, pre-emptive or anticipatory, rather than reactive or defensive, measures.
A 'PRECAUTIONARY' EMERGENCY?
Climate change is an inherently global or internationalist problem, and initiatives to tackle it have emanated from international bodies and actions, notably the UN and _____________________________________________________________________________________ for unified control… The second is the need for a marshalling of the entire resources of the nation… And in so far as this marshalling is effected by legislative means, the legislation will of necessity extend into virtually every field of the social, economic and industrial life of the community. 
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Volume 38 ____________________________________________________________________________________ non-governmental (especially scientific) communities. 91 As considered below, from an Australian perspective this character of the 'emergency' necessarily invokes action with respect to the Commonwealth's powers to legislate for external affairs.
International climate change law centres on the Framework Convention, the foundational instrument of international climate law. It was established as a joint initiative of the UN Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organisation in 1989, supported by a UN General Assembly Resolution, 92 and its work led to negotiation and adoption of the Framework Convention in 1990.
The 'ultimate objective' of the Framework Convention is 'to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.' 93 Additionally, the Framework Convention contains the imperative that parties apply the precautionary principle to climate policy. 94 The precautionary principle may be viewed as a central animating principle as to means of achieving the defining objective of the Framework Convention, that is, 'stabilization' of emissions at a level avoiding 'dangerous anthropogenic interference'. The precautionary principle need not be the sole principle on which emergency measures might be based. There are other inter-related and powerful concepts also informing this principle and climate change action: notably, concepts of 'intergenerational equity' 95 and geopolitical equity between developed and developing states. The emergency could perhaps equally be termed a 'fiduciary' 96 or 'equitable' emergency, having regard to adapted principles of fairness across developed/developing state and generational relations. The precautionary principle may, however, be useful in giving legal form to a declaration of climate emergency for two reasons. First, it is orientated specifically to action and includes a specific calculus of action: anticipation and/or prevention of harm notwithstanding an absence, deficit or ambivalence of knowledge. In this respect, it is -by analogy again and with regard to different purposes -not entirely dissimilar to pre-emptive or anticipatory action regarding 'national security' contingencies. Second, the precautionary principle does possess relatively developed, relevant legal content.
The precautionary principle
Origins of the precautionary principle lie in German environment law (the Vorsorgeprinzip, or 'foresight principle'). In international law precaution has been adopted as an approach to pollution in trans-boundary contexts and extended to issues such as GMOs and electromagnetic radiation. 98 In respect of risk and uncertainty operating in natural and other systems, it embodies a 'rejection of the assumptions inherent in the traditional "assimilative capacity approach"'. 99 The principle rejects the notion that scientific knowledge can invariably predict the scope and level of harm to systems and, as such, harm can necessarily be accommodated or prevented by subsequent human action. At Principle 15, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development ('Rio Declaration') states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 100 A range of planning and environmental legislation in Australia requires the precautionary principle to be considered in decision-making. 101 Typically, in Australian law, the principle operates as one consideration among a number, in which case the decision-maker may not be 'obliged to accord pre-eminence to the precautionary principle.' 102 It may be required that the force and effect of the precautionary principle is qualified by an economic imperative (ie 'cost-effectiveness'). It has been argued that the precautionary principle should be given a greater primacy in decision-making. 103 
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It has been noted that the precautionary principle is 'plagued with uncertainties'. 104 The precise status of the precautionary principle in international law is not settled, and the internal content of the model may vary. 105 By the 1990s, it was being argued that the precautionary principle had assumed the status of a customary norm of international law. MacIntyre and Mosedale assert that '[i]ts inclusion in the Rio Declaration is significant as it could be argued to mark the elevation of the principle to the status of a core principle of international environmental law-making.' 106 Mead has affirmed that analysis. 107 In so far as the principle was the subject of state practice and evidence of opinio juris prior to the Rio Declaration, its status as customary international law may be older than the Rio Declaration. 108 This issue of legal force and effect remains the subject of debate. The technical question as to precise legal character may well be unnecessary or unhelpful. Peel concludes that 'the concept is in danger of becoming bogged down in a legal quagmire or endless debate over its interpretation as a principle or as an approach. A textual analysis reveals little difference [between them]…' 109 Ambiguity and flexibility at the margins of content is likely to be advantageous and necessary in application of the mechanism to practical problems. 110 In Telstra Corporation Limited v Hornsby Shire Council, Preston CJ in the NSW Land and Environment Court comprehensively reviewed the principle. 111 His Honour found, first, two thresholds of jurisdictional fact ('condition precedent') apply: the threat of serious or irreversible damage, and scientific uncertainty. Second, once these thresholds are met the evidentiary burden as to the threat is reversed and the 'decision- Hence, it is necessary to refer to other sources of information on the precautionary principle, including judicial decisions of other jurisdictions and the academic literature on the precautionary principle. Drawing on these sources, the following guidance can be offered on the concept of the precautionary principle and its application. 106 McIntyre and Mosedale, above n 100, 230. 107 Mead, above n 104, 158-68. 108 Cameron and Abouchar, above n 103. 109 Peel, above n 105, 500; see also Mead, above n 104, 165:
Some academics argue that determining whether the precautionary principle is a rule of customary international law … has become a moot point due to the strong acceptance of principle 15 of the Rio Declaration which has been universally applied, without even considering if it constitutes a rule of law or not. 110 Peel, above n 105, 500: 'The harsh reality of decision-making under conditions of scientific uncertainty is that judgements as to which risk regulatory approach was the right one can only be made in hindsight. maker must assume that the threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage is no longer uncertain but is a reality.' 112 Third, the principle obliges preventative action. Fourth, the principle does not imply a total absence of risk, and precaution may operate by degrees, taking into account 'the combined effect of the degree of seriousness and irreversibility of the threat and the degree of uncertainty.' 113 Generally, 'the magnitude of environmental damage is … inversely proportionate to the likelihood of the risk in order for precaution to be triggered.' 114 Fifth, as an extension of calculations as to risk, precautionary action is governed by a proportionality of response: 'the concept of proportionality … should not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives in question.' 115 Further, in respect of the threat of serious or irreversible damage, it is merely the risk that is sufficient to activate the principle, although the standard precludes the 'threat of negligible environmental damage' 116 and 'speculation about mere possibilities of harm and causation, without any rational basis in sound scientific data.' 117 The criteria of 'seriousness' and 'irreversibility' are not mutually inclusive. 118
The 'safe climate' and the precautionary principle The precautionary principle has been applied in review of administrative decisions in which climate change is a factor. In applying the principle as a pre-eminent consideration of legislative and regulatory action, would there be an imperative for emergency action? Consider first of all the threshold issues. Even on the basis of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report ('FAR'), it has been held in judicial consideration of climate change (and relevant cases) that it 'presents a risk to the survival of the human race and other species. Consequently, it is a deadly serious issue. It has been increasingly under public scrutiny for some years. No doubt that is because of global scientific support for the existence and risks of climate change and its anthropogenic causes.' 119 There is a general consensus among scientific opinion that 'anthropogenic interference in the climate system' is occurring and its impacts, if left unchecked, will be 'serious or irreversible.' 121 Where the 'emergency critique' tends to go further than the IPCC assessment is to insist on nonlinear, potentially catastrophic effects of 'interference', placing greater weight and certainty on 'tipping points' or 'boundary' thresholds and thereby on the criterion of 'irreversibility'. That is to say, the 'emergency' analysis insists not only on the criterion of seriousness or 'gravity' 122 but cumulatively (rather than alternatively) on a high degree of likelihood and a high degree of magnitude of irreversibility of damage arising from 'anthropogenic interference.' 123 Further, on the basis of the IPCC Report, scientific uncertainty is actually minimised, given the high degree of likelihood that adverse 'anthropogenic interference' is occurring. 124 Where there is greater scope for uncertainty, and consequently a greater role for the precautionary principle, is where the theses of nonlinear catastrophic change are considered. For instance, the precautionary principle would suggest that IPCC reticence with respect to 'ice sheet flow', 125 and abstention on issues of positive feedback and critical events, ought to be discounted for presumptions of catastrophic 'boundary' thresholds and 'current evidence' that those boundaries are 'fast approaching' or have been exceeded. In respect of growing support for the latter theoretical and empirical positions, they attain the status of at least 'reasonable scientific plausibility'. 126 On the basis of the uncertainty criterion, the latter approach is additionally warranted given that the magnitude of potential damage (unprecedented in scale, scope and effect) presupposes a yet lower threshold of certainty. The likelihood of catastrophic climate change is sufficient to compel action of the precautionary kind. Beyond the 'conditions precedent' threshold, the principle holds that, in respect of climate change, the evidentiary burden for abstention from emergency action falls upon those who would argue that such means of achieving rapid and sustained 'decarbonisation' of social and economic activity are incorrect or unnecessary.
The principle, then, holds that a response must be proportionate to the threat. In the framework of the 'climate emergency' analysis, proportionality therefore needs to be risk-weighted against a much lower threshold of atmospheric carbon concentration than is provided for in either official policy (eg Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth)) or official advice (eg Stern or Garnaut Reports). The difference in atmospheric concentration targets, 'dangerous' thresholds, and warming scenarios between 'orthodox' and 'emergency' opinion lends itself to distinct levels of proportionate (precautionary) response: what has been termed the 'new business as usual', on the one hand, and emergency action, on the other hand. Such generalised models of response are perhaps all that can be articulated in the limited space available. 127 The calculation of proportionately in respect of action will be based on strategic and political, as well as strictly economic (eg cost-benefit) analysis. 128
Constitutional accommodation and the external affairs power Any 'climate emergency' measures in the Australian context would presume legislative and executive action, aimed at giving effect to international objectives to avoid 'dangerous' climate change and keep warming under two degrees. For example, under the Greens' Safe Climate Bill (the legal architecture of which is modelled on the Government's CPRS Bill 2010), there is legislative provision for a long-term emissions reductions target 129 as well as requirement for annual controls on emissions by regulation. 130 In the 'emergency' scenario both legal mechanisms would presumably be used for significant and rapid emissions cuts. 131 A further question is therefore pertinent: would emergency laws intended to achieve these ends, where they are likely to be disruptive of the status quo, 132 be constitutionally valid? The competence of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for 'external affairs' under s 51(xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution would surely be central to resolution of the question. I will confine my remarks to that head of power.
National measures enacting a 'climate emergency' would primarily be enacted under the competence conferred by s 51(xxix). It is arguable that international matters Dangerous change, even loosely defined, is going to be hard to avoid. Unless emissions begin to decline very soon, severe disruption to the climate system will entail expensive adaptation measures and may eventually require cleaning up the mess by actively removing CO2 from the atmosphere. Like an oil spill or groundwater contamination, it will probably be cheaper in the long run to avoid making the mess in the first place. Reduction Scheme Bill 2009 (Cth) ss 13-15. 131 As noted above, the Greens' long-term (2020) target is ostensibly aimed at an overall, global GHG concentration target (350 ppm CO2-e) consistent with the 'emergency' analysis. 132 For example, in respect of an emissions trading scheme, annual targets that suddenly and disruptively raise costs and significantly undermine profitability on 'carbon-intensive' industries, either at primary source (eg coal-fired energy production) or in 'downstream' use (eg, manufacturing, road transport).
including the Framework Convention, 133 the international legal status of the precautionary principle, and even international scientific opinion, suffice to bring the climate change issue within the scope of that head of power.
The fact that external affairs may arise as a source of emergency action in pursuit of ecological objectives flows from the major role environmental issues have played in the High Court's expansion of the external affairs power since the 1980s. As Peel and Godden argue: 'Supplemented by other broad constitutional powers, such as the corporations power, the Commonwealth is only just shy of achieving a plenary environmental power.' 134 There is now a series of important cases 135 underpinning a wide ambit for legitimate action under the external affairs power: '… there are various aspects to the Commonwealth's power over external affairs and that when these are combined s 51(xxix) is now truly one of the most extensive legislative powers available to the Commonwealth.' 136 The scope of the Commonwealth's legislative competence has expanded as the subject matter and field of international relations has expanded. 137 There remains uncertainty about the precise limits of the Commonwealth's competence with respect to external affairs. This uncertainty arises in part because of the spectrum of status and effect of international legal norms and standards. 138 It is clear that 'external affairs' incorporates treaty obligations and other sources of 'hard' international law. Competence is not confined to action in conformity with legal obligation. 139 The test emerging from Koowarta v Bjelke-Peterson was whether a matter was of 'international concern.' 140 In so far as Commonwealth action seeks to give effect to international participation and relationships, focus is less on the status of norms or standards (eg obligations) to be adopted -which would 'import an arbitrary limitation into the exercise of the [external affairs] power' 141 -than on the subject matter of the norms, measures or agreements to which a law purports to give effect. 'Proportionality' of legal measures designed to give effect to those objectives in other words refers to 'appropriate and adapted' means of 'achieving what is said to provide [a law] with the character of a law with respect to external affairs …' 142 Operation of the purposive character of the external affairs power is to all intents and purposes the same as for the defence power. 143 Despite limits as to the obligatory character of the Framework Convention, including defining objectives and means in arts 2 and 3, the Convention itself, even without further obligations, is a basis of 'external affairs'. The 'within 2°C' condition contained within the Copenhagen Accord represents perhaps some refinement of the Article 2 'stabilization' objective.
The interpretational problem of 'dangerous' climate change: constitutional facts Whether or not emergency powers are a valid exercise of Commonwealth power in response to climate change (and in particular as a response in mitigation of the causes of climate change) is a question of proportionality, or 'appropriate and adapted' means of confronting the crisis. In turn, proportionality depends on the characterisation of the object and purposes for which the power is being exercised, as it is expressed in international agreements or norms and the subject matter therein. That process of characterisation of subject matter will, in the context of climate change and in particular in the application of the precautionary principle, include significant questions of fact and/or scientific opinion. 'Constitutional fact' doctrine will play a role in the determination of whether emergency laws are constitutionally acceptable means in Australia for dealing with the climate change crisis.
The Framework Convention represents the main source of international law and subject matter of 'external affairs' in respect of climate change. Applying the precautionary principle, the key object of the Convention is prevention of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. The precautionary 'threat of serious or irreversible damage' is applied in this context. The key factual question, that might reasonably and proportionately attract an emergency response, is contained _____________________________________________________________________________________ comment can be made in regard to reliance upon customary international law, general principles of international law, and matters which have been the subject of international recommendations. 139 within the precise gravity, scope, modelling, and urgency of that 'threat'. Much turns on the meaning and conception of 'dangerous,' or in other words, the characterisation of the threat of 'dangerous' climate system interference will determine whether extraordinary measures might attract the reach of the external affairs power.
Scientific opinion as to the meaning of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system', as I have noted above, tends toward two generalised poles: an orthodox position in which 'dangerous' interference comprises a GHG concentration of around 450 ppm CO2-e and/or 2ºC atmospheric warming (with, at best, a policy of abstention on the question of nonlinear models of change), and what might be argued to be the 'emergency' position, inferred in notions of nonlinear and catastrophic thresholds and a 'safe' climate zone of around 350 ppm CO2-e. On the latter body of opinion, we have already entered the zone of 'dangerous interference'. In the former case, emergency measures arguably would be perceived as unnecessary because there is time, capacity and will only to implement a relatively gradual transition, incorporating a global 'plateau' and gradual decline in emissions; in the latter case, necessity, imperative and leadership require a different approach. The question as to which general model of fact is correct (as, for example, would the distinction of war and peace in respect of validity of extraordinary measures under the defence power) will determine, to a considerable degree, the character, nature and meaning of 'dangerous' interference in the climate system and hence the proportionality or disproportionality of 'emergency' laws. The validity of 'climate emergency' laws will depend, if constitutionally challenged, 144 on an ascertainment that the second body of facts and scientific opinion is the correct approach.
As Professor Zines has written: 'There will be times … when it will be constitutionally necessary for the [High] Court to determine for itself the existence of a particular fact or the proper interpretation of a treaty provision.' 145 This task arises because it has become settled law, at least since the Communist Party Case, that the High Court is the ultimate 'arbiter' of the Constitution, notwithstanding circumstances where constitutional validity of impugned laws turn on questions of fact. The question really is how the Court approaches the 'constitutional fact' finding process, and, specifically, how it would do so in applying the precautionary principle. It is not then a straightforward task, nor one guided by a clear body of rules and principles. 146 In these circumstances, the Court will not be required to act as an ordinary trier of fact as between parties. Constitutional fact ascertainment is a specific, 'peculiar' issue concerning 'information which the Court should have in order to judge properly of the Unlike the [United States] Supreme Court, the High Court has, for most of its history, proved reluctant to acknowledge the relevance of facts in constitutional adjudications and even now, has not developed a coherent body of practicable principles to control 'constitutional fact' ascertainment. Zines, above n 139, 656-7: 'Because the presentation of social and economic material in the High Court is something of an unusual event, the procedures that are sometimes adopted are highly unsatisfactory'. of its validity. 158 Ultimately, however, given the global nature of the issue, much may depend on the state and disposition of international opinion, especially as reflected in international agreements or other instruments, whether as treaty terms, resolutions or recommendations, or whether in the form of international law or scientific advice. In the absence of clear rules as to 'active, independent inquiry' 159 into constitutional factfinding, 'political' momentum may play a key role. Validity of 'precautionary' emergency measures may depend significantly on an actual or emerging consensus as to a heightened character of 'dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system'.
CONCLUSIONS
There has been ample warning of the exceptional nature of the risks associated with anthropogenic climate change for an extended period of time. Governmental policy, especially in the developed world, and industrial practices have tended in practice to disregard or minimise these risks. There was no doubt a time when concerted preventative action on climate change could have avoided any necessity for emergency measures. A growing body of scientific opinion implies or directly suggests that that time has passed, or is fast retreating. There is evidence that humanity has proceeded beyond the 'safe operating zone' in respect of atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions.
This paper has sought primarily to deal with the question of means to achieving that 'safe' climate zone, presuming that analyses of a nonlinear crisis in the climate system are correct and that 'emergency' policy measures are necessary and appropriate. 'Emergency' programs in this sense refer generally to those proposing serious and significant breaks with existing economic and/or social norms and conditions. This paper has sought to consider the meaning and viability of legal means in adoption of 'emergency' measures in response to climate change, and applicability of the legal condition of the 'state of emergency' to climate policy. This question is considered in the Australian legal context, notwithstanding that the political appetite for drastic or radical measures in this country to reduce emissions has, other than in minority quarters, actually receded rather than advanced.
Employment of emergency laws by governments is not in fact especially peculiar. 'Climate emergency' laws would arguably represent an evolution in the model of emergency powers, as well as an evolution in governmental strategy in combating climate change. It is not ostensibly a military, economic or humanitarian emergency. It is a preponderant socio-ecological crisis. To that end, in the Commonwealth context and with regard to relevant international law, exceptional and novel climate change measures might validly be exercised in the sphere of 'external affairs'. The purposive character of the exercise of powers in that governmental sphere accommodates, in principle at least, an 'elasticity' in the valid use of the power, a factor that, as in _____________________________________________________________________________________ statement in the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 171: '… it is not necessary that the subject be one of concern demonstrated by the other nation States generally. For example, concern expressed by the world's scientific community or a significant part of it over action or inaction in Australia might be enough to bring a matter within Australian external affairs.' 158 See also Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1, 161-8 (Murphy J). 159 Kenny, above n 146, 165.
